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Abstract: The global resurgence of religion confronts Westphalian International Relations 
(IR) with a fundamental challenge. Effectively, the rise of religious fundamentalism resurrects 
the important debate over the role religion should play in world politics, a debate long 
forgotten since the Treaty of Westphalia. Consequently, the epistemological and ontological 
controversies of the Protestant Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment are revived, 
leading to a thorough questioning of the secular, materialist and positivist assumptions at the 
heart of the field of IR (Part 1). Besides, fundamentalism represents a theoretical challenge. 
Effectively, its transnational and religious dimensions being hardly reconcilable with any one 
paradigm of the field of IR, it is essential to develop new interpretive categories and analytical 
frameworks for the incorporation of the phenomenon into the field. As such, an attempt is 
made at developing such a framework through a critique of Samuel Huntington‟s the Clash of 
Civilizations (Part 2). Finally, the difficulties of mainstream IR in dealing with the revival of 
religious fundamentalism are further illustrated through a study of the impact of its 
Westphalian, secular, materialist, and positivist assumptions on our understanding of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism (Part 3). While the transnational and theological dimensions of 
fundamentalist terrorism can be accounted for by the framework developed in Part 2, the 
essentially intuitive nature of its religious dimension poses greater difficulties since reliant on 
an alternative source of knowledge and authority. 
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 4 
Introduction: 
The Resurgence of Religion1: 
The 20th century has witnessed the resurgence of religion on a global scale. What 
western scholars thought had been relegated to the private sphere of life was in fact becoming 
increasingly powerful in the public domain. This resurgence of religious movements was 
thought to be a reaction to modernity, democracy, liberal values like freedom, and critical 
enterprises like science. In the late 20th century, this religious revival took a radical turn in 
many parts of the world.  
Theories were developed to explain the return of this long forgotten „opponent,‟ 
namely religious fundamentalism.
2
 The tendency was to categorise those fundamentalist 
movements as regressive, reactionary, traditional, as „disintegral tribalism,‟ or „medieval 
fossils‟ struggling for socio-economic change at the national level.3 But after the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in September 2001, the extent of their adaptation to the modern world 
left academics doubtful about the previously-alleged backwardness. 
Effectively, events such as the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the 9/11 attacks on 
American territory caught academics by surprise. At the heart of their surprise was their great 
difficulty to accept the fact that religious phenomena could have the power to defy not only 
local governments, but also the world‟s only superpower on its own territory. This failure to 
understand the religious facet of world-shaking political events has been traced back to the 
                                                        
1 The concept of religion will only be defined in the last section of this dissertation. As for now, it is sufficient to 
consider religion as the careful and scrupulous observation of „religious experiences.‟ In turn, creeds are only 
codified and dogmatised forms of original religious experiences. 
2 The term „fundamentalism‟ was coined in the early 20th century to designate a broad conservative movement 
within American Protestantism. In this dissertation, the concept is used in a cross-cultural sense so as to 
transcend the actual „fundamentalist‟ movement and to allow for a better theorisation of a global phenomenon. 
For deeper considerations of the pros and cons of such a broadening, see Euben, R.L., Enemy in the mirror. 
Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1999. pp.16-19. 
3 Scruton, R., The West and The Rest. London: Continuum, 2002. p.103. Schweitzer, Y. & Shay, S., The 
Globalization of Terror. London: Transaction Publishers, 2003. p.11. 
 5 
positivist and materialist nature of the epistemological and ontological foundation of 
international relations theory.
4
  
Moreover, the idea that such a challenge could be mounted by a transnational non-
state actor was quite bewildering. Effectively, the Realist domination of the field and its 
reliance on the state-centric Westphalian construction of international affairs led to the 
dismissal of the “political and economic significance of various non-state actors, independent 
of state control, such as transnational corporations and international organisations of 
miscellaneous kinds.”5 Consequently, the transnational dimension of the current global 
resurgence of religion was equally ignored.
6
  
Because the field of international relations (IR) has not been able to account for the 
revival of fundamentalist movements and because “the global resurgence of religion confronts 
IR theory with a theoretical challenge comparable to the end of the Cold War or the 
emergence of globalization,”7 it seems essential to consider the following research question: 
How could Westphalian International Relations theory confront the theoretical challenge 
mounted by the global resurgence of fundamentalism? If the resurgence of fundamentalism is 
to be confronted, we must go beyond the implicit assumption that religion does not require a 
reflection within IR theory
8
 and, as Goldstein and Keohane enjoin us, elaborate new 
interpretative categories and analytical frameworks so as to incorporate the religious and 
transnational dimensions of the phenomenon into the field of IR.
9
 
                                                        
4 Petito, F. & Hatzopoulos, P., Religion in International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. pp. 
79-105. Fox & Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
pp.9-33, 83-113. Smith, S., „Positivism and beyond,‟ in Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, (eds.) International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Thomas, S., The global resurgence of 
religion and the transformation of international relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. pp.21-53. 
5 Haynes, J., „Transnational religious Actors and International Politics,‟ in Third World Quarterly Vol. 22, No.2, 
(2001) p.143. 
6 Appleby, S. & Marty, M. (eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
p.622. Esposito, J. & Watson, M., (eds.), Religion and Global Order. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000. 
pp.51, 91. 
7 Petito, F. & Hatzopoulos, P., Op. Cit., p.3. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R., Ideas and Foreign Policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993. pp.11-12. 
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Structure of the Dissertation: 
In the first part of this dissertation, I offer to review the central reasons behind IR‟s 
difficulties in considering religious fundamentalism as a potentially important force in 
international affairs. As I will demonstrate, these difficulties are rooted in deeply seated 
epistemological and ontological assumptions that are at the heart of western modernity.
10
 I 
will come to the conclusion that these assumptions prevented the transnational and religious 
facets of the phenomenon under scrutiny from being explored. 
Consequently, the second part of the dissertation will be concerned with incorporating 
the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalism into the field of IR through the 
elaboration of adequate interpretative categories and analytical frameworks. I offer to 
consider the strengths and weaknesses of one of the very few studies in the field of IR to treat 
the subject of culture, and indirectly of religion, from a theoretical standpoint. I will 
demonstrate that Samuel Huntington‟s The Clash of Civilizations provides the seeds – and 
only the seeds - of an analytical framework that could allow for a comprehensive theorisation 
of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon.  
Finally, in the third part of this dissertation, I will consider the case of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism. After having reviewed the extent to which Westphalian, positivist, 
and materialist assumptions outlined in Part 1 have tainted the study of the phenomenon, I 
will consider whether the theoretical model developed in Part 2 could provide a better account 
of the movement. Islamic terrorism represents one of the most recent challenges to 
Westphalian IR mounted by a religious and transnational non-state actor. Furthermore, being 
                                                        
10 In this dissertation, modernity refers to “An intellectual tendency or social perspective characterized by 
departure from or repudiation of traditional ideas, doctrines, and cultural values in favour of contemporary or 
radical values and beliefs (chiefly those of scientific rationalism and liberalism).” Oxford English Dictionary. 
Online Edition at http://oed.com, s.v. „Modernity.‟ 
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the “most influential phenomenon of the start of the millennium,”11 Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorism is significantly relevant to the subject treated in this dissertation 
I will come to the conclusion that while the transnational dimension of 
fundamentalism can be incorporated into the field of IR, the religious dimension poses greater 
difficulties. Effectively, the religious dimension of the phenomenon does not simply refer to 
some kind of connection to an institutionalised religion. Rather, what makes the movement 
religious is its reliance on an alternative source of knowledge for understanding the world that 
is different from reason and the senses. Ultimately, if the religious facet of fundamentalism is 
to be properly accounted for, our understanding of this alternative source of knowledge must 
be developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 Weinberg, L. & Pedhazur, A. (eds.), Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism. London: Frank Cass, 
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Part 1: The foundations of Westphalian IR theory 
1. The foundations of IR: 
Even though the 20
th
 century witnessed the global resurgence of religion, western 
nations were far from being prepared to face the challenge mounted by the September, 11 
attacks. As Fox and Sandler noted in Bringing Religion into International Relations, in the 
wake of 9/11,  
Should policy makers have turned to the relevant academic disciplines, 
the situation was not much better. Despite Samuel Huntington‟s Clash 
of Civilizations and Mark Juergensmeyer‟s The New Cold War, the 
discipline of international relations was not ready for the inclusion of 
the religious variable into the contending paradigms in the discipline.
12
  
 
In this first chapter, I offer to explore the central reasons behind the field‟s unreadiness 
to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalist movements. I will 
demonstrate that the inscription of the rejection of religion “in the genetic code of the 
discipline of International Relations”13 is due to (1) the ontology and epistemology of 
modernity, (2) the Enlightenment roots of western social sciences, and (3) the Westphalian 
foundation of the field of IR. 
 
a. The Protestant Reformation (1517-1648): 
The advancement of modernity and the religio-political upheavals that accompanied 
its spread and maturation can be traced back to 31 October 1517 when Martin Luther nailed 
his list of complaints about the Church on the door of the cathedral of Wittenberg.
14
 This 
seemingly insignificant event was to become the symbol of the genesis of a profound and 
fundamental transformation of Europe. Effectively, Luther‟s complaints were the reflection of 
deeper and widespread social changes that proved radically challenging to the order of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2004. p.71. 
12 Fox & Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. p.1. 
13 Petito, F. & Hatzopoulos, P., Religion in International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p.1. 
14 Bruce, S., Religion in the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford University press, 1996. p.9. 
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Catholic Church. The Protestant Reformation that subsequently enflamed the European 
continent for over a century was to inaugurate a new „era.‟  
At the heart of the Reformation was the flourishing of a tremendous and all-pervading 
„rationalising force‟ inherent to the Judeo-Christian tradition that would pave the way for the 
demythologisation of the world and the „modernisation‟ of Christian societies.15 The 
rationalisation of all spheres of life would lead to the development of individualism, 
capitalism, and in a subsequent stage, the secularisation of European societies through the 
flourishing of religious pluralism.
16
  
In The Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism, the German sociologist Max 
Weber addressed in great details the rationalising effects of Protestantism. Among the many 
features of the Reformation dealt with in his masterpiece, three central corollaries of this 
rationalisation of society are of particular importance to our subject. The first major 
innovation of Protestantism was the rejection of the „religious division of labour.‟ i.e., the 
institution of religious professionals. From a dichotomous organisation that opposed a handful 
of professionals and virtuosi who placated God on behalf of the society to the religiously 
illiterate laity, Martin Luther preached a non-hierarchical organisation in which one would 
only be guided by one‟s own interpretation of The Book. This atomised organisation favoured 
„the priesthood of all believers‟ and individual „calling‟ at the expenses of institutionalised 
piety.
17
 This, in turn, unintentionally paved the way for the development of religious 
pluralism.
18
 
The second major innovation of the Reformation was the abandonment of intense 
periodic purification in favour of a more regular religious and ethical life. During centuries, 
                                                        
15 Berger, P, The Social Reality of Religion. London, Faber, 1969. Bruce, Op. Cit. p.10. 
16 Bruce, S., A House Divided: Protestantism, schism and secularization. London: Routledge, 1990. pp.26-29. 
17 Marty, M.E., Protestantism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972. pp.51-53; 116-117; 142-154. 
18 It is important to note that for Reformers, religious pluralism meant a de facto secularisation of all institutions 
controlled by the Catholic Church and the creation of a secular public order. Luther, M., „Doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms and the Two Governments.‟ In Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority. Hopfl (ed.) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
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the Catholic Church developed a system in which sins could be forgiven by simply paying 
religious professionals to perform exercises such as prayers or Masses. From this cyclical 
purification that proved a major source of income for the Church but a mockery to morality, 
Reformers developed a linear and irreversible view of life in which the world had been set in 
motion by a watchmaker-God that had subsequently withdrew. Such conception of the world 
and God unintentionally encouraged people to understand life in terms of progress.
19
  
A third major change brought about by the Reformation sprang from John Calvin‟s 
notion of predestination.
20
 Calvin argued that if God is all powerful and all-knowing, He must 
know before birth whether an individual will be saved or damned. As such, Calvinists came to 
the conclusion that those who enjoyed material success were those that would be saved since 
God would not allow sinners to prosper. Thus, if individuals followed their „calling‟ and 
prospered, they could take their material success as a sign from God that they were part of the 
chosen ones. 
Weber argued that the unintended consequences of concepts such as the atomisation of 
piety, progress, and the importance of material prosperity participated in the development of 
what he called „this-worldly ascetism.‟ Religious persons no longer had to retreat from the 
world to live in accordance with God‟s will but were led to behave in a pious manner in the 
material world.  
Weber went on to argue that this „this-worldly ascetism‟ was central to the 
development of European capitalism and its corresponding liberal ideology.
21
 Effectively, the 
removal of the Church as an authority between God and humans meant the development of a 
“laissez-faire religion”22 based on a voluntary principle, the very principle that formed the 
                                                        
19 Bruce, S., Religion in the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford University press, 1996. pp.15-16. 
20 Weber, M, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. pp.55-61. 
21 Vincent, A., Modern Political Ideologies. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. p.24. 
22 Bruce, Op. Cit., p.2. 
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“metaphysical and ontological core of liberal thought.”23 Moreover, besides its contribution to 
the development of capitalism and liberalism, Protestant „this-worldly ascetism‟ encouraged 
the critical use of reason for the continual improvement of material well-being and therefore 
the development of modern science.  
To summarise, the Protestant Reformation was much more than a purely religious 
change. It sprang from localised shifts in values and led to fundamental changes in social 
structures, political organisations, trade, technology, and military might.
24
 From the shepherd 
flock guided by a religious hierarchy, traditions, and customs, Protestants created an order 
based on a voluntary principle rooted in rationality, progress and individualism. In turn, it 
accidentally paved the way to the development of capitalism, liberalism, modern science, and 
most importantly, the fragmentation and atomisation of the dominant Christian order in 
favour of religious pluralism.
25
  
The fragmentation of the Christian Church that had unified Europe for centuries gave 
birth to a century of bloodshed, massacres, and wars. The most important war since the 
Roman era, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), was to give birth to the central principles of an 
international order.
26
 The war was on the one hand religious and involved a struggle between 
Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans and on the other hand political and involved a struggle 
between the Vatican and local princes. 
 
b.  The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648: 
The political dimension of the Thirty Years War found its fullest expression in the 
Peace of Westphalia that was concluded, after decades of an exhausting struggle, at 
                                                        
23 Ibid. p.32. Heywood, A., Political Ideologies. 3rd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p.28. 
24 Philpott, D., „The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations‟. In World Politics, Iss.52, No.2 (January 
2000), p.207. 
25 This last aspect of the Reformation is far-reaching. Effectively, the atomisation of the Church meant that 
sectors such as health care, tax collection, and justice would increasingly be practiced by independent and lay 
professionals. Bruce, Op. Cit. pp.39-49. 
26 Holsti, J., K., Taming the Sovereigns: institutional change in international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. p.122. 
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Osnabrück for the Protestants and Münster for the Catholics. The treaty was the result of 
years of negotiations between all parties involved and marked “the rise of the modern 
international society”27 as well as the redefinition of the role of religion in European politics. 
The roots of the Westphalian Treaty were indisputably to be found in the Reformation and 
Protestantism‟s intrinsic content that pointed to self-determination, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-intervention.
28
 In Daniel Philpott‟s words, “no Reformation, no 
Westphalia.”29  
Christendom and more generally religion came out of the Thirty Years War 
discredited. What were purported to be religious atrocities were so appalling that local princes 
did their best to marginalise and distance themselves from religion. While this was done out 
of self-interest in the acquirement of the Church‟s power and riches,30 it was also the result of 
the development of a widespread liberal and Protestant presumption that peace and religious 
pluralism could only exist if religion was disciplined by a state. The medieval cosmology of a 
united Christian community would be undermined and religion would be privatised, 
marginalised and nationalised.
31
 The creation of a powerful territorial state would supply 
modern man with his basic material and spiritual needs, marginalising in turn religious 
primordial loyalties.
32
 Religious legitimacy would become supererogatory since the state 
would be legitimised through the „will of the people‟ as well as liberal and democratic 
institutions based on the concept of social contract.
33
 To paraphrase Thomas Hobbes, God 
made space to the Great Leviathan, that mortal God to which modern man would owe his 
security and peace. 
                                                        
27 Thomas, S., Op. Cit. p.54. 
28 Vincent, R.J., Non-intervention and international order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. 
29 Philpott, D., Op. Cit. p.206. 
30 Tilly, C., „Reflections on the History of European State-Making.‟ In Tilly, C. (ed.), The Formation of National 
States in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. p.77. 
31 Holsti, J., Op. Cit.. p.40. 
32 Fox  & Sandler, Op. Cit. p.3. 
33 McClelland, J.S., A History of Western Political Thought. London: Routledge, 1996. Part IV. 
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The religious discredit meant the need to rethink the foundation of the international 
order. The Treaty of Westphalia required all parties to recognize the Peace of Augsburg of 
1555, by which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state, 
i.e., the principle of cuius regio, eius religio. Consequently, it marked the beginning of the 
modern state-system since it enshrined the concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention 
in positive international law
34
 and established fixed territorial boundaries for many states.
35
 It 
was agreed that the citizenries would be subjected first and foremost to the laws of their 
respective government rather than to those of neighbouring powers or to the transnational 
authority of the Catholic Church. As such, Westphalia was the “majestic portal which [led] 
from the old world into the new world.”36 
 
c. The Enlightenment (1648-1789):  
The Reformation was followed by the Age of the Enlightenment, a major intellectual 
movement that would culminate in the American and French revolutions in 1776 and 1789 
respectively.
37
 This great intellectual movement of Protestant inspiration was centrally 
concerned with the celebration of reason.
38
 In An Answer to the Question: “What is 
Enlightenment?” Immanuel Kant defined the movement, in 1794, as “man‟s emergence from 
his self-imposed immaturity.”39 He argued that in this Age of Enlightenment, man was called 
                                                        
34 Holsti, Op. Cit. p. 34, 121-122 and chapter 3. 
35 It should be noted that the Treaty of Westphalia did not create sovereign states ex nihilo. Some sort of modern 
state had existed in previous centuries and its development can be traced back to 1500. Westphalia only extended 
and strengthened the status of the modern state. McClelland, J., Op. Cit. pp.278-293. 
36 Gross, L., „The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948.‟ In The American Journal of International Law, Iss. 42, No.1 
(January 1948), pp.20-41. 
37 Vincent, A., Modern Political Ideologies. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. p.25. 
38 Barnett, The Enlightenment and Religion. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. pp.47-48. Besides, 
key figures of the Enlightenment had close ties with Protestantism (Kant, Rousseau, Voltaire, Locke…). 
39 Kant, I., An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?” (1794), Kant: Political Writings. Reiss and 
Nisbet (eds.), 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. p.54. 
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to throw off the shackles of alien guidance as these were detrimental to his “progress toward 
improvement” and away from barbarism (i.e., religion, tradition, customs…).40 
The end of the Enlightenment witnessed the birth of the founder of sociology, Auguste 
Comte.
41
 The discipline of sociology emerged as a response to the challenge of modernity and 
the social changes that accompanied its advancement. Building on the Reformation and 
Enlightenment concepts of progress and rationalisation, classical sociologists, “consider[ing] 
themselves agents of enlightenment,”42 argued that western societies were emerging from the 
religious dogmas and superstitions of the „Dark Ages‟ into the modern world in which 
commerce, sciences and technology would liberate humans. For Comte, the Law of Three 
Stages meant that every branch of knowledge would successively pass through three different 
stages: theological, metaphysical, and positive. Consequently, Comte argued that all societies 
would follow a similar pattern of transition away from the fictions of religion to finally 
culminate in a modern society “governed by industrial administrators and scientific moral 
guides.”43 However, as the Enlightenment and the discipline of sociology swept away clerical 
obscurantism and dogmatism, they “imposed [their] own restrictive prejudice on the scope 
and content of scholarship as on literature and the arts.”44 As such, the social sciences 
originated and participated in the very rejection of religion as an explanation of the world.  
From this concise historical review of the foundations of western modernity, it is 
possible to discern the secular, liberal, and rationalist nature of the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions of the social sciences that would subsequently inform the 
development of IR. In the following sections, I offer to demonstrate how these assumptions 
                                                        
40 Ibid. p.58. It should be noted that a reading of the Enlightenment as a radical break must be balanced by a 
consideration of the continuities between medieval and Enlightenment political thought. See Becker, C., The 
Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932. 
41 It may be of interest to the reader that Comte originally referred to sociology as „social physics.‟  
42 Riesebrodt, M., Pious Passions: the emergence of modern fundamentalism in the United States and Iran. Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. p.3. 
43 Thompson, K., Auguste Comte, The Foundation of Sociology. London: Nelson, 1976. p.13. 
44 Luttwak, E., in Johnston, D., and Sampson, C. (eds.), Religion, The missing Dimension of Statecraft. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. p.8. 
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influenced the development of positivism and materialism, as well as the dominant tradition 
of the field of IR. 
 
2. International Relations Theory: 
a. Classical Realism: 
The essence of the dominant tradition of the field of IR, Realism, can be boiled down 
to the idea that international relations are about sovereign “states pursuing interests defined in 
terms of power.”45 Realism‟s emphasis on state sovereignty is undoubtedly rooted in the 
Westphalian conception of the international order and is accompanied by the „Westphalian 
presumption‟ that religion is no longer supposed to play a role in international relations.46 
States are independent and autonomous units that know no higher authority. Effectively, the 
transnational authority of the Church having withered away during the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment, states are said to live under anarchy. 
The condition of anarchy leads states to pursue national security through the 
accumulation of power, most often defined in material terms (ie., military, economic, 
population), but also defined in qualitative terms (the morale of a nation, strength of 
diplomacy and government…).47 However, anarchy does not mean complete chaos. The 
international system is also made up of positive norms and rules that states have agreed to 
uphold as long as their vital interests are not in jeopardy.  
Undoubtedly, the impact of non-state actors is marginalised in the Realist tradition 
since they become illegitimate units in the Westphalian order. The transnational aspect of 
many actors, be they economic or religious, is thus dismissed as being subordinated to the 
power politics of states. Moreover, by focusing on military and economic power, the roles of 
ideational factors such as identities, ideas, and religion have been reduced to their existence as 
                                                        
45 Brown, C., Understanding International Relations. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. p.32. 
46 Morgenthau, H., Politics among Nations. 6th ed. New York: Knopf, 1985. pp.15-16. 
 16 
aspects of state power, useful superstitions states could use to strengthen the national morale, 
maintain order, and gain legitimacy.
48
  
However, it should be noted that the tradition of Classical Realism was influenced by 
the strong religious commitment of its supporters, at least until positivism and behaviouralism 
were to spread throughout the discipline of political sciences in the United States. Reinhold 
Niebuhr was himself a Lutheran theologian, and his work greatly influenced key realist 
scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan (himself a Presbyterian), as well as “an 
entire post-war generation of scholars and politicians who made American foreign policy.”49 
However, the Protestant convictions of Classical Realists have always remained subordinated 
to their public commitments to the Westphalian order, leaving religion as a private endeavour 
distinct from the realm of international relations.  
Like Classical Realism, all other traditions of the field of IR, with the possible 
exception of postmodernism, are “wedded to a post-Enlightenment epistemology defined by 
the commitment to reading the political world as understandable, explicable, and knowable by 
way of human reason and methods,” 50 and as such can be criticised for failing to account for 
the transnational and religious dimensions of fundamentalist movements.  Effectively, “such 
an epistemology at once determines how we come to know the world and constitutes the 
range of what is knowable.”51 
Therefore, the mutual and exclusive commitment to secular „rationalism‟52 of 
neorealism and neoliberalism or the economic monism and historical materialist foundations 
of Marxism have not allowed for religion to be treated as anything more than a dangerous 
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pathological irrationality or as the opiate of the masses.
53
 In a similar vein, the debate on 
transnationalism started by Keohane and Nye also failed to account for the specificity of 
religious movements by simply considering them in the same way as multinational 
corporations, i.e., as transnational actors.
54
 Likewise, by arguing that when ideas are 
engaging, they become „attitudinal capabilities‟ that inform perceptions, popular beliefs and 
influence the behaviour of states, Joseph Nye reduced religion to the „soft power‟55 of 
attractive ideas.  
In all the above approaches, the substance of fundamentalism is ignored in favour of 
its function, and its religious dimension discarded so as to be incorporated within accepted 
rational categories. As will be demonstrated in Part 3 of this dissertation through a more 
detailed study of the shortcomings of interpretivist approaches, the impact of such a 
discarding on our understanding of fundamentalism cannot be underestimated. 
 
b. The ‘Second Great Debate’: 
In the 1960s, the positivist and behaviouralist trends that swayed through the field of 
political sciences in the United States had a great impact on the field of IR. The spread of 
quantitative methods led scholars to turn various factors in world politics into standardised 
measures so as to use statistical techniques to assess their dynamics. Consequently, scholars 
came only to consider the factors that could be easily interpreted and quantified. As such, 
religion being extremely difficult to understand and interpret into numeric terms, its study was 
left aside in favour of material factors such as GDP or military expenditure.
56
  
Besides, this behaviouralist turn was accompanied by two sets of assumptions that 
were part of the so-called second „Great Debate‟ over theory and methods in the field of IR, 
                                                        
53 It should be noted that Marx‟s conception of religion is quite sophisticated, defining religion as a means of 
expression in a world of alienation. Marx, K. & Engels, F., „Contribution to the critique of Hegel‟s Philosophy of 
Law,‟ in Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Vol.3. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975. 
54 Keohane & Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. 
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positivism and materialism. The triumph of a positivist approach meant the rejection of more 
traditional methods such as those of political philosophy and diplomatic history, as well as the 
demise of the Christian perspectives central to Classical Realism and the English School.
57
 On 
the one hand, Positivism implied naturalism - the application of the methods of natural 
sciences to the social world -, the existence of value-free knowledge and the existence of a 
real world „out there.‟58 On the other hand, materialism assumed that religion and other 
primordial loyalties were only effects of deeper material causes such as economic inequalities, 
modes of production or political oppression, and as such, unable to explain events such as the 
9/11 attacks or the 7/7 bombings. In both cases religion was discarded, to the detriment of US 
foreign policy analysts of 1979 and 2001. 
Effectively, the best example of the failure of materialist reductionism is to be found 
in the inability of US analysts to understand the nature of the Iranian revolution. The 
proposition of studying the religious dimension of the pre-1979 upheavals was vetoed at the 
CIA “on the grounds that it would amount to mere „sociology,‟ a term used in intelligence 
circles to mean the time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant.”59  
Consequently, what the revolutionaries proclaimed to be a religious movement was attributed 
by US analysts to the opposition to an autocratic regime, anger at the Shah‟s corruption, or 
economic resentment due to widespread inequalities. However, as would later become clear, 
the new regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, was no more redistributive, and neither less autocratic 
nor corrupted. A central difference was religious.
60
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3. Summary: 
In this chapter, I demonstrated that the Protestant Reformation had a tremendous 
impact on Western thought by paving the way for the rise of capitalism, secularism, liberalism 
and the Treaty of Westphalia. The intellectual movement of the Enlightenment strengthened 
the Reformation‟s influence on society and political processes and furthered the demise of 
religion as a central international actor. The rejection of religion as an explanatory framework 
for the world was accompanied by the birth of sociology and the scientific study of the impact 
of „modernisation‟ on European societies. In turn, this socio-historical context influenced the 
study of international relations and the structuring of the field in the twentieth century. The 
deeply seated epistemological and ontological assumptions of modernity led to the field being 
overtly secular, positivist, and materialist, rejecting in turn the incorporation of religion as a 
potentially important factor in international relations. 
Because the field of IR, and more specifically the Realist tradition, cannot account for 
the transnational and religious dimensions of the revival of fundamentalist movements, it 
seems essential to consider the following sub-question: How could the religious and 
transnational dimensions of fundamentalist movements be incorporated into the field of IR? 
Consequently, in the second part of this dissertation, I offer to consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of one of the very few studies that derogate to the general rule of IR discarding 
religion. We will see that Samuel Huntington‟s The Clash of Civilizations provides the seeds 
of an analytical framework and interpretative categories that would allow for a comprehensive 
theorisation of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the 
phenomenon.  
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Part 2: A Civilisational Alternative to Westphalian IR Theory 
In the first chapter, I arrived at a preliminary answer to our central research question. 
Effectively, I demonstrated that besides the need to transcend the implicit „Westphalian 
presumption‟ that religion is no longer supposed to be part of international politics, if 
Westphalian IR theory is to confront the theoretical challenge mounted by the global 
resurgence of fundamentalism, it is essential to elaborate new interpretative categories and 
analytical frameworks so as to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of the 
phenomenon into the field of IR. 
Therefore, the second part of the dissertation will be concerned with developing such 
categories and frameworks. More precisely, because the field of IR already possesses 
rudimentary theoretical frameworks, I offer to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the 
most debated pre-9/11 theoretical study to take into account religion and culture as powerful 
actors in international affairs. I hope to demonstrate that despite great abstractness and 
monolithism Samuel Huntington‟s The Clash of Civilizations provides the seeds of a 
framework that could allow for a comprehensive theorisation of the religious revival, 
respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon. However, because of 
methodological and ontological incoherence, I will come to the conclusion that it is essential 
to move away from Huntington‟s conceptions of the state and civilisation to more diffuse 
entities developed in „institutional‟ terms.  
 
1. The Clash of Civilizations: 
a. Outline: 
The Clash of Civilizations has its origins in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article in which 
Huntington, drawing on the work of Bernard Lewis,
61
 made some stunning predictions about 
the post-Cold War order. His controversial article led to a vigorous debate in the field of 
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international politics. Criticisms were followed by Huntington‟s response, „If not 
Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the post-Cold War World‟ in which he defended his case 
by reminding his detractors that The Clash was only an attempt to develop elements of a post-
Cold War paradigm which could only be disproved by the creation of a better one. In 1996, 
Huntington extended the original article into a book which has been extensively reviewed, 
revealing a general scepticism among scholars. 
Rooted in the uncertainty of the post-Cold War decade and developed as a backlash to 
Francis Fukuyama‟s triumphalist „End of History,‟ The Clash attempts to lay down the 
foundation of a „New World Order.‟ Based on the analysis of two global processes, 
Huntington argues that the bipolar world order has been replaced by a multi-civilisational 
order. First, the global dynamics of modernisation and globalisation have weakened local 
identities in favour of an increase in civilisational consciousness. Second, the failure of grand 
ideologies such as communism and fascism has led to an ideological vacuum that was soon 
filled by religion. As a result of these world dynamics, he argues that identities and loyalties 
have been lifted from the local and state levels to the broader cultural entity of civilisation.  
Huntington distinguishes seven and „possibly‟ eight different civilisations which are 
defined by common religion, history, language, customs, institutions, and most importantly 
the subjective self-identification of people.
62
 Like nations, civilisations are imagined 
communities conceived of as „sacred‟ fraternities for which people are ready to sacrifice their 
lives. In Huntington‟s words, “[f]aith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify 
with and what they will fight and die for.”63 
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In this multi-civilisational world order, civilisations are supposed to „act‟ through their 
influencing states, the latter being depicted, as in the Realist tradition, as power maximisers.
64
 
As a result, conflicts become inter-civilisational and take place either between states along 
civilisational „fault-lines‟ or between the cultural hegemons of each civilisation. 
In relation to the academic context outlined in the first chapter, by arguing that 
patterns of conflict in the post-Cold War order will follow cultural lines, The Clash of 
Civilizations seems to provide a plausible alternative to the Westphalian construction of 
international affairs based on sovereign states pursuing their interests defined in terms of 
power. Consequently, Huntington‟s paradigm might prove relatively adequate to incorporate 
the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalist movements into the field of IR. 
Because of its unsettling nature, The Clash has been all too often dismissed without 
good reasons. Furthermore, Huntington‟s prose being very seductive but ambiguous, he has 
often been misinterpreted. In the following section, I offer to consider some of the critiques 
most relevant to our subject. 
 
b. Quantitative objections to The Clash: 
The vigorous debate that followed the publication of The Clash had a strong 
quantitative dimension. Scholars tried to use - more or less satisfactorily – statistical tools to 
test Huntington‟s central hypotheses. However, before looking at some of these studies in 
more details, it should be noted that many quantitative studies are ideologically tainted, 
methodologically flawed and sometimes contradictory. Besides, because of the difficulties 
associated with the quantification of religion, biases rooted in Westphalian, positivist, and 
materialist assumptions pervade many studies.  
The ideological taint of most studies is best exemplified by Norris and Inglehart‟s 
profoundly questionable results. Effectively, the two Harvard scholars found Muslims to be 
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more supportive of democratic ideals than westerners. 87% of Muslims were found to be 
convinced democrats, more than in any other civilisation. Likewise, the approval of 
democratic ideals and democratic performances by Egyptians were found to be higher than 
those of the peoples of Sweden, Switzerland or France!
65
  
Concerning methodological flaws, the most widespread bias pertains to the time span 
under consideration. For example, Henderson and Tucker tested Huntington‟s hypotheses on 
the period 1816-1992 and Russett, O‟Neal and Cox considered the period 1950-1992. How 
could their study disprove the clash when Huntington himself restricted the applicability of 
his thesis to the sole post-Cold War era and acknowledged the temporal validity of his 
paradigm?
66
 
Though many studies are flawed, more rigorous quantitative analyses come to a 
similar conclusion: the clash is simply not taking place.
67
 While such a conclusion comes as 
an easy argument for dismissing The Clash in its entirety, it should be strongly qualified. 
Effectively, besides the facts that Huntington has many supporters
68
 and that some 
quantitative studies prove some aspects of his paradigm,
69
 Weinberg and Eubanks‟s research 
on terrorism lends credit to Huntington‟s paradigm. They argue that because of the 
asymmetrical power relations, non-western civilisations can only resort to terrorism, and 
quantitatively terrorism follows a civilisational pattern.
70
 Besides, Fox and Sandler 
demonstrated that some features of the Clash are plausible from a western perspective since 
the majority of the conflicts in which the West has been involved during and after the Cold 
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War are civilisational and that post-Cold War conflicts involving the West are mainly with 
Islam.
71  
While quantitative studies are often used to dismiss Huntington‟s thesis out of hand, as 
we have seen, the complexity of the phenomenon cannot easily be quantified and except the 
chimerical nature of the clash, nothing can easily be deduced from statistical approaches. In 
such a context, it seems wiser to conclude that quantitative studies prove inconclusive. This is 
why we now turn to more qualitative critiques. 
While Huntington‟s The Clash of Civilizations has been criticised on many fronts, 
many criticisms contradict one another.
72
 “It also should be pointed out that many who 
criticize Huntington […] can be accused of many of the same shortcomings.”73 However, a 
few critiques are worth taking seriously. In the following section, I offer to consider in more 
depths two fundamental shortcomings of his paradigm. While these do not prove fatal to the 
overall theory, a reframing of the debate would greatly strengthen the analysis. 
 
c. Qualitative Challenges to The Clash: 
Besides the facts that Huntington‟s paradigm is sometimes self-contradictory and 
ignores important events in favour of carefully selected anecdotes,
74
 the strongest criticisms 
are methodological and theoretical. The first criticism has been mounted by Esposito and 
concerns the oversimplifying effects of the division of the world into civilisations. The second 
criticism springs from Huntington‟s vague use of the central concepts of culture and religion. 
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i. Civilisations and Over-simplification 
The first central weakness of Huntington‟s paradigm concerns the nature of the 
civilisational units and has been pinned down by John Esposito. In The Islamic Threat: Myth 
or Reality? Esposito argues that: 
Huntington accepts an outdated monolithic notion of civilization […] In 
reality, civilizations, like countries, are complex, encompassing diverse 
and often contradictory beliefs, values and forces that belie facile 
generalizations. He fails to address seriously the great diversity and 
differences [...] that exist not only among but also within […] societies.75  
  
However, this failure to address internal diversity results, to a certain extent, from a 
methodological choice. 
Effectively, first of all, the reader should keep in mind that The Clash of Civilizations 
is a global paradigm and as such, because “local politics is the politics of ethnicity, [and] 
global politics is the politics of civilization,” Huntington‟s study focuses on civilisational 
struggles, leaving local and minor conflicts to political scientists such as John Esposito.
76
 
Secondly, the global dimension of Huntington‟s paradigm requires him to take a 
holistic and nomothetic perspective, leading him in turn to downplay differences and focus on 
similarities when exploring the world. Although such an approach has certain drawbacks, it 
allows for the development of a theoretical „map‟ that is more simple than the actual 
„territory‟ but not too simple for understanding the world‟s major events at the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century. However, while the above methodological considerations weaken Esposito‟s 
criticism, they do not prove that the map is not over-simplifying the „territory‟ and that the 
methodology is adequate.  
Likewise, it is important to note that Huntington‟s civilisations are not territorially 
defined as many critiques assumed. Rather, “where once one‟s identity was rooted in territory, 
ethnicity and religious nationalism have become „de-territorialized‟ to the point where 
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adherents…identify with each other as much as, if not more than, they do with their fellow 
citizens of their national homeland.”77  
As a result, complex and pluralistic civilisational entities are turned into intellectual 
tools that can be usefully employed to understand global historical phenomena but which 
remain limited because of the level of abstraction at which they operate. Additionally, by 
moving away from geographically defined civilisations to entities couched in de-
territorialized terms, civilisational analysis moves beyond extreme geographical monolithism 
while still providing a cultural map of the world order; a map that would have remained 
invisible had we taken an idiographic (i.e., Esposito‟s) or statist approach.78 
 
ii. Civilisations: Culture or Religion? 
The second criticism springs from the questionable interchangeability in Huntington‟s 
use of two key concepts, religion and culture. As explained in the previous sections, 
Huntington‟s paradigm is concerned with the exploration of cultural entities, and as such, it is 
not directly related to the phenomenon under scrutiny in this dissertation, religion. However, 
under close examination, The Clash might well be more about religion than about culture; the 
latter being used to refer to the former because of the inherent aversion to religion of the 
Westphalian presumption outlined in Part 1.  
Even though civilisations are said to be cultural entities, throughout Huntington‟s 
study, religion is considered as the principal dimension of civilisations. Huntington himself 
explicitly states that “religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations.”79 More 
importantly, of all the civilisations considered, only the existence of the African civilisation is 
qualified as a remote „possibility.‟ The fact that Huntington qualifies the existence of the only 
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civilisation that is only based on fully non-religious identification may well imply that 
religion is the foundational basis for his concept of civilisation.  
Furthermore, this is to be contrasted to the fact that two civilisations bear the name of 
their defining religion (Islamic and Hindu) and that concerning the Sinic civilisation, 
Huntington notes that its religion, Confucianism, is its “major component.”80 Likewise, 
concerning the Western civilisation, Huntington comes to a similar conclusion to that reached 
in Part 1: the West is partly defined by „the effects of the Reformation and . . . [its] combined 
Catholic and Protestant cultures.‟81 Finally, the central differences between the Western 
civilisation on the one hand and the Orthodox and Latin American civilisations on the other 
are thought to be religious.
82
 
The importance of religion is also considerable concerning the role it is believed to 
play in the post-Cold War order. In a similar line to that of scholars such as Haynes, 
Juergensmeyer, Saliyeh, and Schupe, Huntington argues that modernisation separated people 
from their local identities and national loyalties, leaving religion as the only landmark for the 
uprooted of modernity.
83
 Moreover, the ideological vacuum created by the demise of 
communism and nationalism is also believed to have been filled by religion.
84
 
Lastly, the importance of religion is quantitatively demonstrated by Fox. Besides the 
fact that statistically religion and civilisations are closely related (more than 79% of 
civilisational conflicts have a religious dimension and vice versa – lending credence to the 
idea that Huntington‟s concept of civilisation “is mostly a surrogate variable for religion”85), 
religion seems to have a better explanatory power. Furthermore, more conflicts in the last two 
decades have been religious than civilisational. As such, to emphasise religion at the expenses 
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of culture would strengthen Huntington‟s paradigm. As we will see in Part 3, by moving away 
from culture to religion, religious movements that are „acultural,‟ such as Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism, can be more adequately understood since traditions are no more 
superimposed on the movement. 
In the second part of this chapter, through the development of a third central criticism, 
I offer to explore the central attraction of Huntington‟s theoretical approach to religion based 
on the concept of civilisation. I will argue that despite abstractness and monolithism, a 
civilisational approach could potentially provide solid foundations for the incorporation of the 
religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalism. However, I will demonstrate that 
because of methodological and ontological incoherence, it is essential to refine Huntington‟s 
realist conceptions of the state and civilisation into more diffuse entities couched in 
institutional terms.  
 
2. The Civilisational Alternative: 
a. The state/civilisation relationship: 
In the last sections of this paper, I am willing to explore the nature of Huntington‟s 
civilisations and their hazy relationship to the state system. Effectively, to speak of 
civilisations in de-territorialized terms is to stress the political fragmentation of civilisational 
entities, and as such, to imply the impossibility for civilisations to behave “as historical actors 
in a unified and forceful fashion.”86 This led scholars like Senghass and Melleuish to wonder 
how civilisations could clash if they are not politically united. 
In The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington rejects the above argument as it assumes that 
states and civilisations are of a similar nature, namely, that they assume a „rational actor‟ 
status allowing them to fight wars or maintain order.
87
 Rather, Huntington conceives of 
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civilisations as cultural and not political entities, suggesting that states and civilisations are 
symbiotically complementary and not duplicative. Accordingly, he argues that states will 
remain the principal political actors in international affairs, but that their interests will be 
increasingly shaped by civilisational factors.  
As such, Huntington seems to assign states and civilisations different „spheres of 
existence,‟ developing a model based on a civilisational and cultural structure combined with 
a statist political superstructure. Such a model seems to parallel Sorokin‟s conception of 
civilisations as „ideational‟ entities rooted in particular „mentalities of culture‟ of which states 
are only the manifestations.
88
  
However, the structure/superstructure model is not without concerns. Effectively, if 
civilisations are ideational entities which find their expression in states, how could we know 
whether a state‟s action finds its roots in the cultural structure or solely in the political 
superstructure? How can we make sure that we do not superimpose on a given configuration 
of political, social, and economic phenomena civilisational roots that are not there?
89
  
Accordingly, is Huntington‟s methodology adequate to prove that a conflict is rooted 
in the civilisational structure and not simply in the political superstructure? Effectively, 
Huntington relies extensively on anecdotes and statements of political leaders to back up the 
existence of the civilisational structure. Yet, if states and civilisations are of a different nature, 
statements made by political leaders cannot be considered as being the direct reflection of the 
civilisational reality. 
Consequently, Huntington is unable to offer an explanation (1) to bridge the 
ontological structure/superstructure divide, and consequently, (2) his methodology becomes 
inadequate to proving that a state‟s behaviour is rooted in its civilisational structure. While 
Huntington does not provide any solution, other scholars have developed alternatives. In the 
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final section of this chapter, I offer to move beyond Huntington‟s conceptions of the state and 
civilisation as outlined in The Clash and to explore two complementary alternatives which 
could provide stronger theoretical foundations for the inclusion of religion into IR. 
 
b. Civilisational ‘Institutional Constellations’: 
In Rethinking International Relations, Fred Halliday argues that the traditional 
conception of the state as a „territorial-national totality‟ defined as “a territorial association of 
people recognised for purposes of law and diplomacy as a legally equal member of the system 
of states” precludes any analysis of the influence international factors may have over states.90 
More precisely, and in relation to Huntington‟s civilisational approach, the traditional 
conception of the state as sovereign precludes any consideration of the influence of the 
cultural or religious structure on the state political superstructure.
91
 
Alternatively, Halliday offers a more flexible conception of the state in terms of 
“coercive and administrative institutions, distinct from the broader political, social and 
national context in which it finds itself.”92 Such an approach enables us to move away from 
the state as an autonomous totality to a more diffuse conception couched in terms of the 
panoply of administrative institutions of a society. In turn, such definition allows us to 
consider the international dimension of the state.
93
 
A complementary alternative has been developed by sociologists of civilisations. 
Based on the Durkheimian conception of civilisation, Arnason and Delanty argue that a 
civilisation‟s superstructural expression takes the form of „families of societies,‟ that is, 
“socio-cultural frameworks within which smaller units can organize themselves in a more or 
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less autonomous fashion, and elaborate their variations on shared themes.”94 Accordingly, 
while civilisations may have a unitary ideational dimension, they may also take the 
geopolitical form of civilisational “institutional constellations.”95  
The relationship between Halliday‟s conception of the state in terms of administrative 
institution and Arnason‟s conception of civilisation as institutional constellation points to a 
way the structure/superstructure divide might be bridged. In turn, this might open a space for 
interpreting religious movements in non-statist terms while avoiding the extreme monolithism 
of Huntington‟s civilisations.96  
 
3. Summary: 
In this second chapter, building on the work of Samuel Huntington, I developed a 
framework sensitive to religion and transnationalism and yet complementary to the 
Westphalian state-system. Despite its many weaknesses, and the chimerical nature of the 
clash itself, The Clash of Civilizations provided the seeds of a less monolithic and more 
religiously sensitive framework developed in terms of institutional constellations. 
While Huntington‟s civilisational entities proved useful to a certain extent, because of 
methodological and ontological reasons, I moved away from his realist conception of the state 
as a territorial-national sovereign totality and from the civilisation as an ideational monolithic 
unit to more diffuse conceptions of both entities developed in institutional terms. 
Consequently, a post-Huntingtonian civilisational approach may provide an adequate 
framework to incorporate the transnational and religious dimensions of resurging 
fundamentalist movements into the field of IR. 
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In the third part of this dissertation, I will investigate the impact of the Westphalian, 
materialist, positivist, and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our understanding of 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. I will demonstrate that the above presumptions have tainted 
and distorted our appreciation of the movement. Consequently, I will consider how the 
civilisational framework developed in Part 2 could offer a more accurate depiction of Islamic 
terrorism. I will come to the conclusion that while this framework is useful to a certain extent, 
if religious phenomena are to be better understood, a more fundamental epistemological and 
ontological issue must be explored. 
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Part 3: Islamic Terror and the Westphalian Presumption 
 
 
In the first part of this dissertation, I arrived at a preliminary answer to the question of 
how Westphalian International Relations Theory could confront the theoretical challenge 
mounted by the global resurgence of fundamentalism. Effectively, through a brief historical 
review of the foundation of the social sciences and of the field of IR, I demonstrated that the 
„Westphalian presumption‟ as well as secular, positivist, and materialist assumptions hindered 
our understanding of the role of religion in international affairs. I concluded that if religious 
resurgence is to be confronted, it is essential to elaborate new interpretative categories and 
analytical frameworks so as to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of the 
phenomenon into the field of IR. 
In the second part of the dissertation I attempted to develop such theoretical tools by 
building on the work of Samuel Huntington. I demonstrated that The Clash of Civilizations 
provides the seeds of a framework that could allow for a comprehensive theorisation of the 
religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon.  
Finally, in the third part of this dissertation, I offer to investigate the impact of the 
Westphalian, materialist, positivist, and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our 
understanding of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. I will demonstrate that the above 
presumptions have tainted and distorted our appreciation of the movement.
97
 Being “the 
single most influential phenomenon of the start of the millennium,”98 Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorism is significantly relevant to the subject treated in this dissertation.  
After a brief historical review of the rise of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, I will 
explore three central themes pertaining to its study: traditionalism, nationalism, and the 
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implicit superiority of secular knowledge over faith. Whilst exploring each of these themes, I 
will consider the ways in which the framework developed in Part 2 could remedy the 
drawbacks of traditional Westphalian IR theory. I will come to the conclusion that while this 
framework is useful to a certain extent, it remains insufficient.  
However, before going any further, it is essential to consider the following question: 
Why should Islamic fundamentalism be studied within a modern and Western-centric 
paradigm? After all, during its long history, Islam has fostered rich cultural and philosophical 
resources. Would it not be more appropriate to judge fundamentalism according to its own 
normative tradition rather than to turn to an exogenous construct, particularly given that 
modernity is “distinctively a western project?”99 This issue will implicitly be dealt with by 
arguing that Islamic fundamentalist terror is itself an „acultural‟ expression of modernity.100 
 
1. Islamic Fundamentalism 
a. A brief Historical Review 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the world bore witness of the rise of political Islam promoted 
by a revolutionary self-proclaimed vanguard. The aim of political Islam was to re-create the 
Golden-Age of the first decade of Islam and supersede tribal, ethnic and national divides, the 
resilience of which was attributed to pre-Islamic ignorance (Jahiliyya) or to colonial policy 
and „alien innovations‟ (Bid‟ah). But Islamic fundamentalists started using concepts such as 
„sovereignty,‟ „nation,‟ and „civil society‟ and aimed at creating an Islamic „state‟ that would 
unite the global Muslim community, i.e. the Ummah. As such, they contributed to the 
development of the nation-state in the Middle East, and thus furthered, contrary to their 
avowed goals, the secularisation of politics.
101
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In the 1990s, a „hyper-religious‟ movement took over political Islam in reaction to the 
hyper-politicisation of the latter.
102
 This development into the resurgence of Islam entailed a 
radicalisation and a re-islamisation of the society as a prelude to the organic re-emergence of 
the Islamic rule. This was waged under the banner of what Olivier Roy calls „neo-
fundamentalism.‟103 Today, neo-fundamentalism is not a structured movement articulated 
around a coherent and unitary doctrine. Rather, it is a trend, a state of mind, a dogmatic 
relation to the fundamentals of religion, a new form of religiosity. Because of their literalist – 
yet selective - approach to the Holy Scriptures, neo-fundamentalists reject the idea of the 
multiplicity of Islam. By the same token, they consider themselves the only True Muslims. 
 
b. Modernisation Theory and Globalisation in IR: 
In the late 1980s, an increasing number of scholars turned to the globalisation 
paradigm to shed light on international politics. The process of globalisation, being an 
offshoot of and rooted in modernity, retains most of its characteristics.
 104
 To the threefold 
foundation of modernity outlined by Max Weber (i.e., 1. Capitalism - the development of a 
new ethos of labour and a market-oriented social structure; 2. Rationalisation – secularisation, 
Westphalian state system, individualism; 3. Disenchantment – alienation, loss of confidence 
in the political process), the globalisation paradigm appends the notion of de-
territorialisation.
105
 Effectively, peoples, societies, organisations and their actions are said to 
become more „global‟ and more interconnected, leading the world to become a „single place‟ 
through the challenging of time/space barriers by transport, communication technology, and 
medias.
106
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It is in such a theoretical framework that Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is 
commonly studied. Generally, fundamentalist phenomena are said to be “part of a larger 
phenomenon of anti-globalization and tension between the have and have-not nations.”107 In a 
similar vein, as a former State Department official put it, Islamic fundamentalism is said to be 
“a socio-political protest movement sugar-coated with religious pieties.”108 Effectively, the 
prevalent thesis states that because the world is „shrinking,‟ cultures are being brought closer 
to one another, leading to an unavoidable corrosion of traditions, religions, and specific 
cultures. In order to stop this erosion, fundamentalists are ready to resort to violence and 
terrorism.
109
 In this regard, some see religious terrorism as a reactionary movement against 
global forces of cultural and economic change, a war between „MacWorld‟ and „Jihad,‟110 
„Lexus‟ and the „Olive Tree,‟111 and a reaction to „coca-colonization.‟ Some go as far as to 
argue that Islamic “terrorism should be seen as a strategic reaction to American power,”112 
reducing fundamentalist terrorism to a “near automata, angry blisters on the body politic 
reacting to socioeconomic irritants.”113  
However, as we will see below, to assume that fundamentalism is a reaction to certain 
political or socioeconomic circumstances reinforces “the neglect of a fundamentalist system 
of ideas as a substantive vision for the world”114 and only allows for scientific studies of the 
causes of fundamentalism. Besides, this „anti-fundamentalist‟115 approach is based on 
questionable assumptions rooted in the positivist, materialist and Westphalian biases outlined 
in Part 1. In the following sections, I will investigate the impact of these biases on our 
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understanding of the traditionalist, nationalist and religious dimensions of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism.  
 
2. Traditions, Culture and Individualism: 
As explained in Part 1, the Protestant Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment 
developed in reaction to the oppressiveness of traditions and religious dogmas as these were 
thought to keep humans in a state of permanent immaturity and to impede their progress.
116
 
As such, the development of the two intellectual movements was accompanied by the belief 
that a decrease in traditions and religion would be a necessary feature of any progress away 
from barbarism.  
Concerning the study of Islamic fundamentalism, this belief still enjoys widespread 
support in that the call of Islamic fundamentalists for a strict return to the Koran and Sunnah 
leads many scholars to define the movement as inherently anti-modern and opposed to 
progress. Consequently, Islamic fundamentalists are commonly considered as regressive, 
reactionary, as „disintegral tribalism,‟ or „medieval fossils.‟117 However, the sophisticated 
planning of the attacks on the Twin Towers may well point towards a different reality. 
 
a. Islamic Fundamentalism and De-Territorialisation 
In fact, Islamic fundamentalism is adapted to many dimensions of modernity. 
Effectively, first of all, Olivier Roy argues that Islamic neo-fundamentalism has learnt to cope 
with de-territorialisation - meaning the end of Dar-ul-Islam,
118
 as a geographical entity. As 
such, the success of neo-fundamentalism among quite different sociological milieus, from 
Taliban tribes to Saudi Arabian middle class, moving through suburbs of Western Europe, is 
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mainly due to what Roy calls “the plasticity of the neo-fundamentalist matrix.”119 This 
plasticity is due to the two interwoven processes of de-contextualisation and deculturation. 
Because fundamentalists praise the de-contextualisation of religious practices, they 
adapt themselves to the basic dimension of globalisation, that of turning “human behaviour 
into codes and patterns of consumption and communication disconnected from any specific 
culture.”120 Secondly, because fundamentalists advocate deculturation, they make it possible 
to rebuild the Muslim Ummah on a purely religious basis; the latter identifying “itself across 
borders in terms of a global form of legitimacy.” 121  
Because of this plasticity, neo-fundamentalists came to discard the past as being a 
form of „cultural‟ Islam, hence “valorising the uprootedness of uprooted people.”122 In turn, 
such an historical attitude frees believers from the bonds of pristine societies, tribes and social 
status. As such, “Islamic fundamentalism is not, as some would argue, a neo-traditionalism, 
nor is it aimed at a re-traditionalisation of Islamic societies.”123 Rather neo-fundamentalism is 
adapted to globalisation; it has internalised and addressed the changing forms of religiosity by 
disembedding itself from particular societies and distancing itself from traditions. 
However, it is often argued, and rightly so, that neo-fundamentalists are prone to 
imitate the Prophet on all matters, requiring all actions, attitudes, and behaviours to be 
referred to a religious norm. Islam becomes a „totalistic‟ code and life a puritanical ritual.124 
Such behaviour has often been assimilated with traditionalism, nostalgia for a „pure‟ past, and 
a will to “return to Islam‟s founding period 1,400 years ago.”125 Yet, it might be argued that 
such a return does not involve any cultural or social aspects, that it is a purely religious return 
to the essentials contained in the Koran and the Sunnah aiming at purifying Islam from 
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subsequent accretions.
126
 As a result, Islamic fundamentalists are neither nostalgic nor 
backward-looking but simply acknowledging the ageless roots of their „Holy‟ project.  
 
b. Islamic Fundamentalism and Individualism 
 The second reason why neo-fundamentalists cannot be considered as anti-modern 
resides in their extreme emphasis on individualism. Effectively, Islamic fundamentalists 
advocate a total surrender of oneself to God and insist on personal faith and steadfastness. In 
Cronin‟s words, one acts “directly or indirectly to please the perceived commands of a 
deity.”127 This implies a clear focus on individualism and individual interpretation of the 
scriptures.
128
 In this complete surrender to God, individual action takes precedence over the 
result and the intention over the nature of the act.
129
 For example, to undertake Jihad, 
becomes a spiritual end in itself and an ultimate proof of the reform of the self. Victory comes 
as a bonus,
130
 hence the tendency among young radicals towards martyrdom (Shaheed). In 
such a context, one is freed from the bonds of brotherhoods, religious institutions, traditions, 
and patriarchal notions of order.
131
  
 By pretending to ignore the cultural context and by providing a code of conduct that 
functions in a similar manner in any part of the world, Islamic fundamentalism works along 
the same lines as globalisation – capitalism, individualisation, deculturation, and de-
territorialisation. Besides, religious inspiration may well be a way of avoiding the 
disenchantment and the „iron cage‟ aspect of modernity. Therefore, it seems more adequate to 
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conclude that the failure to grasp the nature of Islamic fundamentalism springs from 
questionable conceptions of modernity, progress, and religion that may well be informed by 
the secular, materialist, and positivist biases outlined in Part 1.  
This aversion to religion and tradition could be remedied by the adoption of the 
analytical framework developed in Part 2. Effectively, by developing units that are religious 
by nature, the framework moves beyond the „Westphalian presumption‟ that religion should 
no longer play any role in international affairs while refraining from imposing a set of cultural 
traditions on fundamentalism. As such, it respects the „acultural‟ and anti-traditional nature of 
the movement. 
  
3. Fundamentalism, Nationalism and the State 
a. Fundamentalism and the pursuit of statehood 
The second theme that is worth mentioning concerning the study of Islamic 
fundamentalism springs from the state-centricity of Westphalian IR. In a relatively recent 
article, Mary Kaldor argues that Islamic fundamentalists are „regressive‟ because they “seek 
political power – [and the] control of the state.” 132 Kaldor further asserts that 
All these groups have what might be described as a modernist view of the 
state. They still believe in state sovereignty and reject the conditionality 
that has accompanied globalisation.
133
 
 
However, such a focus on statehood is hardly representative of the reality. Fundamentalists 
clearly reject any legitimacy not anchored in the Holy Scriptures, and such legitimacy is 
impossible to achieve for any kind of regime that is not in itself a fundamentalist one.
134
  
The unification of the Ummah, and the worldwide spread of the „True Faith‟ are the 
alleged ultimate goals of Islamic neo-fundamentalists. Consequently, militants are not only in 
                                                        
132 Kaldor, M., „Terrorism as Regressive Globalisation,‟ in Open Democracy, 25 September 2003, p.2. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Weinberg, L., and Pedhazur, A. Op. Cit. p.82. 
 41 
opposition to earthly state rulers, but also to the Westphalian state-system.
135
 As Gilles Kepel 
reminds us, “not all of the contemporary movements in religion […] have a short-term aim 
seizure of power and revolutionary transformation of society.”136 For example, Tablighis 
consider that “true religious faith can be maintained only in freedom from politics.”137 
Concerning Al-Qaeda, Rohan Gunaratna reminds us that “Osama never interpreted Islam to 
assist a given political goal.”138 
Neo-fundamentalists advocate a strict implementation of the Shariah (Islamic Law) 
with no concession to man-made laws. Therefore, they discard the state while sharing a 
modern „libertarian‟139 view of it, pragmatically accepting it as a lesser evil.  
The existence of the state is acceptable only if it serves the purposes of the 
Islamic community and its leaders are legitimate only as long as they 
uphold the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, in which case they are 
indeed forgiven for other errors or omissions.
140
  
 
Therefore, the Islamic state is only endowed of a moral and a theological character that is by 
no means rooted in some kind of popular self-determination. Kaldor‟s misunderstanding of 
the aims of fundamentalist movements may well be the result of the superimposition of the 
Westphalian state-centric framework on the alleged aims of fundamentalists. 
 
b. Fundamentalism as ‘New nationalism’ 
Similarly, in a more recent article, Mary Kaldor argues that the Islamic fundamentalist 
resurgence represents a type of regressive „new nationalism.‟ She argues that the “ideologists 
of the movement evoke the „Islamic nation‟ and the basic idea of uniting around a common 
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culture, Islam and a religious language, Arabic, is a nationalist idea.”141 But can nationalism 
have its roots “in the transcendent and not in the soil?”142  
Effectively, the so-called „Islamic nation‟ does not refer to an ethnic, territorial, or 
historical entity. Rather, it is a community of the faithful based on nothing but the recognition 
of the unity of God and that Muhammad is the Prophet. Secondly, as explained in the 
previous sections, fundamentalists reject culture as pre-Islamic ignorance (Jahiliyya). Finally, 
while God spoke Arabic in the 7
th
 century, modern preachers use European languages to 
spread the Word. Therefore, it is wiser to conclude that Islamic neo-fundamentalism marks 
the death of nationalism rather than its revival and that this so-called „new nationalism‟ 
springs from the superimposition of the Westphalian state-centric framework on Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
As explained in Part2, this superimposition of the Westphalian analytical framework 
on Islamic fundamentalism can be remedied through the adoption of a civilisational 
framework. Effectively, while states and nations are maladapted categories to the 
transnational and global nature of neo-fundamentalism, a focus on de-territorialized religious 
civilisational units allows for a proper incorporation of the breadth and nature of the 
movement into IR theory. 
 
4. Fundamentalism and secular knowledge 
a. Reason versus Intuition 
Finally, the third theme that is worth mentioning concerning the study of Islamic 
fundamentalism concerns the alleged superiority of reason over faith. As explained in Part 1, 
because “reason is…only a phenomenon whose very existence requires its opposite to define 
itself against,” the Age of Enlightenment developed in opposition to a conception of the 
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„irrational‟ defined in terms of servility to dogma, superstition, and religion.143 As such, to the 
blind acceptance of religious doctrines, philosophers opposed the universal and critical use of 
reason, taking the subsequent development of science and the great benefits it brought to 
mankind as proofs of the superiority of reason over religion. 
The impact of this assumption on the study of Islamic fundamentalism led many 
scholars to assert that because of their public surrender to God and their reliance on religion 
as a source of knowledge, fundamentalists are “opposed to modernity.”144 The fact that 
Islamic fundamentalists claim that “sacred knowledge is the superior form of knowledge, and 
that there is a „correct‟ interpretation of events given by God which cannot be contradicted by 
human reason,”145 led again Mary Kaldor to classify fundamentalists as „regressive.‟ 
Effectively, the seemingly blind faith of fundamentalists is thought to correspond to an 
outdated approach to knowledge and truth, an approach that has been proved entirely wrong 
by the great advancement of reason and science.  
However, Pitirim Sorokin argues that there are three complementary sources of 
knowledge: the senses, reason, and intuition, with “each source of knowledge [disclosing] 
some aspect of the manifold reality.”146 The current crisis, Sorokin would argue, is due to “the 
illusion that there can be only one valid system of truth”147 – that of secular reason for 
Westphalian IR, and that of faith and intuition for Islamic fundamentalists.
148
  
As explained in Part 1 and as we will see below, because of the commitment of 
Westphalian IR to secular reason, most theories discard the intuitive source of authority of 
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religion.
149
 This discarding was explicitly advocated by Martin Wight on the ground that the 
reduction of religion to a rational and philosophical discourse would keep it from remaining 
“inchoate, invertebrate, given over to uncontrollable fancies and perilous imaginings.”150 
However, as Thouless argues, “acceptance of religious belief as revelation should [not] be 
condemned as irrational, although there are obvious difficulties in the rational communication 
of its authority to anyone not accepting the revelation.”151 
Effectively, theological creeds are only expressions of a religious experience that 
Rudolph Otto “aptly termed the „numinosum,‟ that is, a dynamic existence or effect, not 
caused by an arbitrary act of will, […that] seizes and controls the human subject, which is 
always rather its victim than its creator. The numinosum is an involuntary condition of the 
subject, whatever its cause may be.”152 It is this non-rational source of authority that lends 
credit to religious dogmas and leads fundamentalist groups to claim certainty. However, this 
experiential source being the only authority behind Islamic fundamentalists‟ motivations, it is 
rationally dismissed through Westphalian IR‟s focus on theological creeds. How could 
religious movements be adequately understood if the very source of their worldview is 
dismissed as “old-fashioned mystical absurdities”?153 In the following sections, I offer to 
explore the implicit presence of this rejection of religious intuition in favour of secular reason 
in major interpretivist approaches to international affairs. 
 
b. Constructivism and Post-modernism 
Constructivism is a relatively recent approach in the field of IR and developed in 
opposition to structural realism by rejecting any autonomous role for structures of power, 
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such as anarchy, in world affairs. Instead constructivists view international relations as 
growing from processes of identity and interest formation, the two most important factors in 
shaping the world order and the current condition of anarchy. In the words of Alexander 
Wendt, “if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not 
structure…Structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process…Anarchy is what 
states make of it.”154 As Fox and Sandler argue, constructivism, “for an approach that sees the 
Westphalian international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble.”155 
Effectively, by arguing that “reality is not God-given or Nature-given, but human 
imposed,”156 constructivism implicitly rejects the intuitive source of religion through the 
development of a kind of „hyper-secularism.‟157 
For example, in „Towards an International Political Theology,‟ Vendulka Kubalkova, 
combines some sort of rationalism with the hyper-secular constructivist ontology of Paul 
Onuf that points to words, speech acts, and rules as the key ontological elements of human 
interaction and of the human view of the world. While mentioning faith and religious 
experiences as central to religion, Kubalkova is led by her constructivist ontology to boil 
down intuition to “individual emotions influencing choices as an integral part of the human 
process of reasoning.”158 Ultimately, the role of God is further degraded when reality is only 
in man‟s mind and under the control of his reason.  
While the dismissing of religion by constructivism is straight forward, the case of 
postmodernism is more complex. Effectively, even though most postmodernists also agree 
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that “reality is not God-given or Nature-given, but human imposed,”159 scholars such as 
Foucault and Derrida have written extensively on religion and negative theology. Derrida 
himself knows “that in praying something happens…a therapy might be taking place…when I 
pray, I experience something strange.”160 Derrida accepts faith in and for itself and 
acknowledges the inadequacy of deconstruction in understanding it since “the experience of 
faith is something that exceeds language…ethics, politics and society.”161 Contrary to 
constructivism, postmodernism has the merit of acknowledging its limits and those of reason 
when it comes to religious faith.  
While the Westphalian state-centricity limits our understanding of fundamentalism, 
the greatest challenge IR theory is facing is that of the inclusion of intuition as a valid and 
independent source of knowledge. This means that it will not be sufficient to incorporate 
religion into our existing concepts and frameworks, or to simply add religion as a variable 
under such categories as church attendance, beliefs in God, etc. Religion cannot be reduced to 
a belief system, an ideology,
 162
 a dimension of identity, soft power, a constructed reality or a 
non-state actor as this would fail to “take account of the autonomous nature of the religious 
impulse.”163  
Effectively, such accounts identify soft power or ideology and Islamic fundamentalism 
as “functionally equivalent,” expressing by the same token “the fundamental assumption of 
the social sciences that they do not have to concern themselves with the substance of a 
historical and political phenomenon, such as religion…but only with the function it plays in 
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society.”164 As such, the raison d'être of fundamentalism is stripped off the religious intuition 
that sustains and inspires it, reducing in turn the study of fundamentalism to the political 
behaviour of its militants. Effectively, the problem with not accepting the substance of 
religion is that fundamentalist movements come to be “interpreted within the accepted 
framework of the social sciences as a return to ideology, and hence as irrational.”165 
 While religion used to be explained away in terms of other social, or material reality 
through the use of social theories based on secular reason, this is no longer adequate as the 
exclusive use of secular rationality cannot be justified any longer. Secular reason does not 
provide an Archimedean standpoint from which intuitive and secular phenomena alike can be 
studied. This is why social theory cannot explain what it means to be an „infidel‟ occupying 
the “land of the two holy places - the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the 
revelation, the source of the message and the place of the noble Ka'ba, the Qiblah of all 
Muslims”166 for these concepts come from a different source of knowledge altogether. It is 
only by accepting religion as a valid and independent source of knowledge that IR theory will 
be able to understand Islamic fundamentalism more fully.  
 
5. Summary: 
In this final part of the dissertation, I investigated the impact of the Westphalian, 
materialist, positivist, and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our understanding of 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Through the study of three central themes pertaining to its 
study, I demonstrated that the ontological assumptions of Westphalian IR theory have tainted 
our understanding of Islamic terrorism.  
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Firstly, I demonstrated that the widespread use of globalisation and modernisation 
paradigms led to the discarding of all that is religious as anti-modern and regressive. Even 
though Islamic fundamentalism has undergone processes of de-culturation and de-
contextualisation, cultural traits and traditions were superimposed on the phenomenon. 
Secondly, I demonstrated that the classification of Islamic fundamentalism as a type of state-
centric „new nationalism‟ was the result of the superimposition of the Westphalian analytical 
framework on the movement rather than the reflection of the alleged goals of fundamentalists. 
Finally, I demonstrated that modernity is accompanied by the questionable assumption that 
secular reason is a source of knowledge inherently superior to religion, faith, and intuition. 
Whilst exploring the central themes of modernisation theory and Westphalian state-
centricity, I argued that the civilisational framework developed in Part 2 could remedy most 
of the drawbacks of Westphalian IR theory. However while the framework is useful to a 
certain extent, it remains insufficient. Effectively, if religion is to be properly accounted for, 
any framework must be accompanied by “discussions about the status of truth or the tension 
between politics and metaphysical conceptions”167 as well as a thorough understanding of 
both reason and religious intuition as valid sources of knowledge. This problematic intuitive 
dimension of religion could be introduced into IR within the frame of the third Great Debate. 
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Conclusion: 
 
Because “the world today […] is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some 
places more so than ever,”168 I attempted in this dissertation to explore the challenge the 
resurgence of religion poses to International Relations theory. In the first part of this 
dissertation, I reviewed the central reasons behind IR‟s difficulties to consider religious 
fundamentalism as a potentially important force in world politics. I came to demonstrate that 
besides the need to transcend the implicit „Westphalian presumption,‟ if IR theory is to 
confront the theoretical challenge mounted by the global resurgence of fundamentalism, it is 
essential to elaborate new interpretative categories and analytical frameworks so as to account 
for the religious and transnational dimensions of the phenomenon. 
Consequently, in the second part of the dissertation, I attempted to develop such 
categories and frameworks by building on the work of Samuel Huntington. I demonstrated 
that The Clash of Civilizations provides the seeds – and only the seeds - of such a framework, 
allowing for a comprehensive theorisation of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth 
and the nature of the phenomenon.  
In the final part of this dissertation, I investigated the impact of the Westphalian, 
materialist, positivist and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our understanding of 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. I demonstrated that the theoretical model developed in Part 
2 is a step towards a better understanding of Islamic terrorism but ultimately remains 
insufficient. Effectively, while it provides an adequate account of the transnational dimension 
of Islamic fundamentalism, the civilisational framework remains unable to account for the 
intuitive substance of religion. In effect, what makes fundamentalism religious is its reliance 
on an alternative source of knowledge for understanding the world that is different from 
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reason and the senses. If religion is to be properly accounted for, any framework must be 
accompanied by a thorough understanding of both reason and religious intuition as valid and 
independent sources of knowledge. Finally, I suggested that such an understanding could be 
developed within the frame of the third Great Debate. 
In the light of this argumentation, it seems wiser to conclude that religious 
fundamentalism, through its affirmation of a different source of knowledge, is confronting IR 
scholars to fundamental ontological and epistemological issues. As such, Fox and Sandler are 
mistaken to believe that “eventually religion will find its rightful place in the discipline within 
the existing paradigms.”169 On the contrary, it seems more adequate to argue, though still 
premature, that “religion has the potential to revolutionise IR theory.”170 
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